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Abstract
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1 Introduction
Economics provides a rich set of powerful theoretical models of human societies. Since these
models usually feature individuals whose motivations preferences and moral values are
given, their predictive power depends on the accuracy of the assumptions regarding these
motivations. However, if the motivations of the members of a society are inherited from
past generations, the formation of these motivations may itself be studied theoretically. In
particular, one may use evolutionary logic to ask what preferences and moral values have a
survival value, and thus ask: what preferences and moral values should humans be expected
to have from rst principles?
It is of general interest, not the least for economics, to understand if and when selsh-
ness may be favored by evolution, and if not, what kind of preferences are likely to emerge
instead. Past research has identied two factors that pull preferences away from pure self-
ishness. First, as observed already by Schelling (1960), it may be advantageous in strategic
interactions to be known or believed to be committed to certain behaviors, or to have prefer-
ences or values, even if these commitments or values appear to be at odds with ones material
self-interest.1 The literature on preference evolution conrms this intuition by showing that
when interactions occur under incomplete information, selshness prevails,2 whereas when
interactions occur under complete information this is no longer the case.3 Secondly, until re-
cently the economics literature has largely disregarded another factor, which has been known
and studied in biology for decades, namely that natural selection favors unselsh behaviors
between relatives, and more generally, between individuals in structured populations, where
most interactions take place within subpopulations.4
We propose a general model for the study of the evolutionary foundations of human
motivation in strategic interactions in arbitrarily large groups. The model can be applied to
1For example, a manager of a rm in Cournot competition, with complete information about managers
contracts, will do better, in terms of equilibrium prots, if the contract rewards both prots and sales, rather
than only prots (a literature pioneered by Fershtman and Judd, 1987).
2See Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001) and Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2007) for analyses of such environments.
3See Heifetz, Shannon, and Spiegel (2007a) for a particularly general such result. See also the literature
overview in Section 2 for references.
4The seminal work on this is Hamilton (1964a,b). For models using game theory, see Grafen (1979, 2006),
Hines and Maynard Smith (1979), Bergstrom (1995, 2009), and Day and Taylor (1998).
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strategy evolution and to evolution of preferences and/or moral values both under complete
and incomplete information, and the random matching may be assortative (as in structured
populations). We dene evolutionary stability as a property of abstract types that can
be virtually any characteristic of an individual, such as a behavior pattern or strategy, a
goal function, preference, moral value, belief, or cognitive capacity etc. The types may be
visible/known or invisible/unknown to others. However, we do not allow that the types
directly a¤ect the material payo¤ consequences of given action proles. Individuals live in
a innite (continuum) population and are randomly matched in groups of size n, to play a
symmetric n-player game with materialpayo¤s. Each players strategy set may be simple,
such as in a simultaneous-move game, or very complex, such as in a sequential game with
many time periods and information sets. Strategies may be pure or mixed. The game has
to be ex ante symmetric (in a sense to be dened), but may be ex post asymmetric, as
long as each player is equally likely to be in any one of the n player roles. The random
matching may be assortative, that is, the type distribution of others in the matchings of any
given individual may depend on the individuals own type. Individuals of types that result
in high payo¤s in these random matchings are taken to have a higher survival probability
than individuals of types that result in low payo¤s. In the model we apply Bergstroms
(2003) algebra of assortative pairwise encounters and show how his index of assortativity,
a one-dimensional measure of the extent of the assortativity, can be extended to n-player
encounters.5
We apply the general model to, in turn, evolutionary stability of strategies (Section 3),
and evolutionarily stable preferences under incomplete information (Section 4), leaving the
study of the evolutionary stability of other types, notably to preferences under complete
(or noisy) information, for future research. In Section 5 we illustrate these two applications
within several commonly studied games in which an individuals material payo¤ depends
on own strategy and some aggregate measure of the others strategies. These games are
examples of aggregative games, and we believe that our results can be fruitfully applied to
other such games.6
5We refer to Bergstrom (2013) and Alger and Weibull (2013) for further discussions of assortativity when
n = 2.
6The notion of aggregative games is, to the best of our knowledge, due to Dubey, Mas-Colell and Shubik
(1980). See also Corchón (1996). The key feature is that the payo¤ to a player depends only on the players
own strategy and some (symmetric) aggregation of others strategies. For a recent paper on aggregative
games, see Acemoglu and Jensen (2013). For work on aggregative games more related to ours, see Haigh and
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Two main results are established. First, although we impose minimal restrictions on
the set of potential preferences or moral values, our analysis of preference evolution under
incomplete information shows that evolution favors a particular class of preferences, namely,
a generalization from 2-player games to n-player games of the homo moralis preferences
dened in Alger and Weibull (2013). For this generalization, one needs to generalize (a) the
notion of game symmetry, (b) the notion of assortative matching, and (c) the notion of homo
moralis. For arbitrary n  2, a homo moralis evaluates her strategy choice in the light of its
e¤ect on her own material welfare as well as on the material welfare that would arise if others
were to probabilistically choose the same strategy. We show that generalized homo moralis
preferences with a degree of morality equal to the index of assortativity are evolutionarily
stable. Furthermore, any preferences such that equilibrium behaviors di¤er from those of
homo moralis with the right degree of morality are evolutionarily unstable. This generalizes
the result in Alger and Weibull (2013) from 2-player to n-player interactions, and the present
instability result is somewhat stronger (even for two-player games), since we here allow for
multiple equilibria.
Our second main result is that behaviors selected for under strategy evolution are the
same as the equilibrium behaviors among homo moralis with degree of morality equal to
the index of assortativity. This result establishes that evolutionarily stable strategies (under
uniform or assortative random matching) need not be interpreted only as resulting when
individuals are programmed to certain strategies, but can also be interpreted as result-
ing when individual are rational and free to choose whatever strategy they like, but whose
preferences have emerged from natural selection. Together with a rst- and second-order
characterization result for games in euclidean strategy spaces, with arbitrary index of as-
sortativity, we obtain easy and transparent methods to nd the (symmetric) equilibria of
n-player games between homo moralis with that degree of morality, methods we illustrate
in various canonical examples.
2 Literature
When introduced by Maynard Smith and Price (1973) the concept of evolutionary stability
was dened as a property ofmixed strategies in nite and symmetric two-player games played
under uniform random matching in an innite population, where uniform random matching
Cannings (1989) and Koçkesen, Ok and Sethi (2000a,b).
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means that the probability for an opponents strategy does not depend on ones own strat-
egy. Broom, Cannings and Vickers (1997) generalized Maynard Smiths and Prices original
denition to nite and symmetric n-player games, for n  2 arbitrary, while maintaining
the assumption of uniform random matching in an innite population.7 They noted the
combinatorial complexity entailed by this generalization, and reported some new phenom-
ena that can arise when interactions involve more than two parties. Evolutionary stability
and asymptotic stability in the replicator dynamic, in the same setting, was further analyzed
in Bukowski and Miekisz (2004). Scha¤er (1988) extended the denition of Maynard Smith
and Price to the case of uniform random matching in nite populations, and also considered
interactions involving all individuals in the population (playing the eld). Grafen (1979)
and Hines and Maynard Smith (1979) generalized the denition of Maynard Smith and Price
from uniform random matching to the kind of assortative matching that arises when strate-
gies are genetically inherited and games are played among kin. Our model generalizes most
of the above work within a unied framework.
In a pioneering study, Güth and Yaari (1992) dened evolutionary stability for para-
metrized utility functions, assuming uniform random matching and complete information.8
This approach is often referred to as indirect evolution.The literature on preference evo-
lution now falls into four broad classes, depending on whether the focus is on interactions
where information is complete9 or incomplete10, and whether non-uniform random matching
is considered.11 Few models deal with interactions involving more than two individuals. Like
here, the articles in this category focus exclusively on interactions that are symmetric in ma-
terial payo¤s, the payo¤s that drive evolution. Unlike us, they restrict attention to uniform
random matching. Koçkesen, Ok, and Sethi (2000a,b) show that under complete informa-
7Precursors to their work are Haigh and Cannings (1989), Cannings and Whittaker (1995) and Broom,
Cannings and Vickers (1996).
8See also Frank (1987).
9See Robson (1990), Güth and Yaari (1992), Ockenfels (1993), Huck and Oechssler (1996), Ellingsen
(1997), Bester and Güth (1998), Fershtman and Weiss (1998), Koçkesen, Ok and Sethi (2000a,b), Bolle
(2000), Possajennikov (2000), Sethi and Somanathan (2001), Heifetz, Shannon and Spiegel (2007a,b), Akçay
et al. (2009), Alger (2010), and Alger and Weibull (2010, 2012).
10See Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001), Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2007), and Alger and Weibull (2013).
11In the literature cited in the preceding two footnotes, only Alger (2010), Alger and Weibull (2010, 2012,
2013) allow for non-uniform random matching. Bergstrom (1995, 2003) also allows for such assortative
matching, but he restricts attention to strategy rather than preference evolution.
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tion about opponentspreferences, players with a specic kind of interdependent preferences
fare better materially than players who seek to maximize their material payo¤. Sethi and
Somanathan (2001) go one step further and characterize su¢ cient conditions for a popula-
tion of individuals with the same degree of reciprocity to withstand the invasion of selsh
individuals, again in a complete information framework. By contrast, Ok and Vega-Redondo
(2001) analyze the case of incomplete information. They identify su¢ cient conditions for a
population of selsh individuals to withstand the invasion by non-selsh individuals, and for
selsh individuals to be able to invade a population of identical non-selsh individuals.
3 Model
Consider an innite (continuum) population of individuals who are randomly matched into
groups of n  2 individuals to interact according to some game given in normal form   =
hX; ; ni, where X is the set of strategies available to each player (individual in the group)
and  : Xn ! R is the material payo¤ function. The set X is a non-empty, compact and
convex set in topological vector space, and the function  is continuous.12 The material
payo¤ to any player i 2 f1; ::; ng from using strategy xi 2 X against the strategies xj 2 X
(j 6= i) of the others in the group, is denoted  (xi;x i), where  is symmetric in x i, the
strategy prole of all other individuals in the group, in the sense that the payo¤  (xi;x i)
is invariant under permutations of the components of x i. These games may thus be called
aggregative.13
Each individual has some type (or trait)  2 , which may inuence his/her choice of
strategy, or behavior in the material game, where  is the set of potential types. Consider a
population in which at most two types from  are present. For any types  and  , and any
" 2 (0; 1), let s = (;  ; ") be the population state in which the two types are represented in
population shares 1  " and ", respectively. Let S = 2 (0; 1) denote the set of population
states. We are particularly interested in states s = (;  ; ") in which " is small, then calling 
the resident type, being predominant in the population, and  , being rare, the mutant type.
In a given population state s 2 S, the behavioral outcomes, or, more precisely, strategy
12All assumptions are not needed for all our claims, but are made at the outset in order to ease the
exposition. All results apply, mutatis mutandis, also to n = 1, in which case   is a decision problem.
13More precisely: for any xi 2 X and x i 2 Xn 1, and any bijection h : f2; 3; :::; ng ! f2; 3; :::; ng:

 
xi; xh(2); xh(3); :::; xh(n)

=  (xi;x i).
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proles used, may, but need not, be uniquely determined. For each population state s, let
V (s)  R2 be the set of (average) material-payo¤ pairs that can arise in population state
s, where, for any v = (v1; v2) 2 V (;  ; "), the rst component, v1, is the average material
payo¤ to individuals of type , and the second component, v2, that to individuals of type  .
We assume that V (s) is non-empty and compact for all states s = (;  ; "). Then
f (;  ; ") = min
(v1;v2)2V (; ;")
v1   v2 (1)
is well-dened. This is the material payo¤di¤erence, in the residentsworst possible outcome
as compared with mutants (in terms of material payo¤s), across all behavioral outcomes that
are possible in state s = (;  ; "). In particular, f (s) > 0 if and only if the residents earn a
(strictly) higher (average) material payo¤ than the mutants in all possible outcomes in that
state.14 By denition, f (; ; ") = 0 for all  2  and " 2 (0; 1).
The following denitions of evolutionary stability and instability are generalizations of
the denitions in Alger and Weibull (2013), from n = 2 to n  2, and from preference
evolution under incomplete information to arbitrary types.
Denition 1 A type  is evolutionarily stable against a type  if there exists an " > 0
such that f (;  ; ") > 0 for all " 2 (0; "). A type  is evolutionarily stable if it is
evolutionarily stable against all types  6= . A type  is evolutionarily unstable if there
exists a type  and a sequence h"ti from (0; 1) such that "t ! 0 and f (;  ; "t) < 0 for all t.
Clearly, by this denition no type is both evolutionarily stable and unstable, and there
may, in general, exist types that are neither stable nor unstable.
Before proceeding, let us briey consider how these denitions relate to Maynard Smiths
and Prices (1973) original denition of an evolutionarily stable (mixed) strategy in a sym-
metric and nite two-player game under uniform random matching. Suppose thus that X is
the unit simplex of mixed strategies in such a game and let  = X, that is, let a type be
a mixed strategy (as if individuals were programmedto strategies). For any population
state s = (x; y; ") 2 X2  (0; 1), the set V (s) of possible material-payo¤ pairs is then a
singleton. Its unique element v 2 V (s) has components v1 = (1  ")  (x; x) + " (x; y) =
 [x; (1  ")x+ "y] and v2 = (1  ")  (y; x) + " (y; y) =  [yx; (1  ")x+ "y]. In other
14The function f is a generalization of the so-called score function in evolutionary game theory, see, e.g.,
Bomze and Pötscher (1989).
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words, v1 (resp. v2) is the post-entryexpected material payo¤ to strategy x (resp. y). By
Denition 1, x is evolutionarily stable against y if f (x; y; ") > 0 for all " > 0 su¢ ciently
small, which is equivalent with being evolutionarily stable in the sense of Maynard Smith
and Price (1973). Suppose a strategy x is unstable in the sense of Denition 1. Since f is
here continuous, there then exists a strategy y 6= x such that f (x; y; ") < 0 for all " > 0 suf-
ciently small, that is, such that this mutants post-entry expected material payo¤ exceeds
that of the resident strategy x whenever the mutant appears in su¢ ciently small population
shares.
3.1 Matching
The matching process is exogenous. In any population state s = (;  ; ") 2 S, the number
of mutants individuals of type  in a group that is about to play the n-player game ,
is a random variable that we will denote T . For any resident drawn at random from the
population let pm (") be the conditional probability Pr [T = m j ; s] that the total number
of mutants in the residents group is m, for m = 0; 1; ::; n   1.15 Likewise, for any mu-
tant, also drawn at random from the population, let qm (") be the conditional probability
Pr [T = m j  ; s] that the total number of mutants in his or her group is m, for m = 1; ::; n.
We assume that all functions pm and qm are continuous, and that each such function has a
limit as "! 0 (for any given m).
It follows that p0 (") converges to 1 as " tends to 0 (and hence lim"!0 pm (") = 0 for all
m > 0). In other words, residents almost never meet mutants when the latter are vanishingly
rare. To formally establish this, we use the algebra of assortative encounters developed by
Bergstrom (2003) for pairwise interactions. For a given population state s = (;  ; "), let
Pr [j; "] denote the conditional probability for an individual of type  that another, uni-
formly randomly drawn member of his or her group also is of type . Likewise, let Pr [j ; "]
denote the conditional probability for an individual of type  that any other uniformly ran-
domly drawn member of his or her group has type . Let  (") be the di¤erence between the
two probabilities:
 (") = Pr [j; "]  Pr [j ; "] : (2)
15The rst random draw cannot, technically, be uniform, in an innite population. The reasoning in this
section is concerned with matchings in nite populations in the limit as the total population size goes to
innity. We refer the reader to the appendix for a detailed example.
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This denes the assortment function  : (0; 1) ! [ 1; 1]. We assume that, as " tends to
zero,  (") converges to some limit  2 R, the index of assortativity of the matching process
(Bergstrom, 2003). Moreover, by setting  (0) =  we extend the domain of  from (0; 1) to
[0; 1).
The following equation is a necessary balancing condition:
(1  ")  [1  Pr [j; "]] = "  Pr [j ; "] : (3)
Each side of the equation equals the probability for the following event: draw at random an
individual from the population at large and then draw at random another individual from
the rst individuals group, and observe that these two individuals are of di¤erent types.
Equations (2) and (3) together give(
Pr [j; "] =  (") + (1  ") [1   (")]
Pr [j ; "] = (1  ") [1   (")] : (4)
Now let " ! 0. Then, from (3), Pr [j; "] ! 1, and hence, as claimed, p0 (") ! 1.
Without loss of generality we may thus uniquely extend the domain of pm from (0; 1) to
[0; 1), while preserving its continuity, by setting p0 (1) = 1.
Turning now to the limit of qm (") as " tends to zero (for m = 1; :::; n), we rst note that
in the special case n = 2,
lim
"!0
q2 (") = lim
"!0
Pr [ j ; "] = 1  lim
"!0
Pr [j ; "] = 1  lim
"!0
 (") = :
However, for n > 2 there remains a statistical issue, namely whether or not, for a given
mutant, the types of any two other members in her group are statistically dependent or
not (in the given population state). Under conditional independence among other group
memberstypes, given the mutants type, one obtains
lim
"!0
qm (") = lim
"!0
 
n  1
m  1
!
(Pr [ j ; "])m 1 (Pr [j ; "])n m
=
 
n  1
m  1
!
m 1 (1  )n m (5)
for all m 2 f1; ::; ng. We will refer to this as the conditionally independent case.16 This
generalizes the limit result for group size n = 2. In the appendix we present a matching
16To be precise, we only require conditional independence in the limit, as expressed in (5).
9
process with the conditional statistical independence property. We nally note that it follows
from (4) that  2 [0; 1].17
3.2 Homo moralis
In Alger and Weibull (2013), we analyzed a similar model, but for pairwise interactions, and
showed that natural selection favors a particular class of preferences that we called homo
moralis. The utility for a homo moralis, with degree of morality  2 [0; 1], from playing
strategy x 2 X against y 2 X in a symmetric two-player game with material payo¤ function
 : X2 ! R is
u (x; y) = (1  )   (x; y) +    (x; x) : (6)
Such an individual thus attaches the weight (1  ) to own material payo¤ and the weight
 to the material payo¤ that would arise should both players use the same strategy x.
While it is not obvious how one should dene such preferences for interactions between
more than two individuals, we will see below that natural selection again points in a particular
direction. Accordingly, for any player i 2 f1; ::; ng, any degree of morality  2 [0; 1], and
any strategy prole x 2 Xn, let ~x : 
 ! Xn be a vector-valued random variable with
statistically independent components ~xj such that Pr [~xj = xi] =  and Pr [~xj = xj] = 1  
for all j 2 f1; ::; ng. We write utility functions in the same form as the material payo¤
function, that is, with the players own strategy as the rst argument and the prole of
othersstrategies as the second argument.
Denition 2 Player i is a homo moralis with degree of morality  2 [0; 1] if his or her
utility function u : Xn ! R satises
u (xi;x i) = E [ (xi; ~x i) j x] 8x 2 Xn: (7)
We note that ~xi is a degenerate random variable that always takes the constant value xi,
and thus
u (xi;x i) = (1  )n 1   (xi;x i) + n 1   (xi; xi; :::; xi)
+

1  (1  )n 1   n 1  E [ (~x) j ~x 6= x; ~x 6= (xi; xi; :::; xi)] :
17This contrasts with the case of a nite population, where negative assortativity can arise for population
states with few mutants (see Scha¤er, 1988).
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At one extreme,  = 0, the individuals goal is to choose a strategy xi that maximizes her
own material payo¤, given the strategy prole x i for all other participants. At the opposite
extreme,  = 1, her goal is to do the right thingaccording to Kants categorical imperative
applied to material payo¤s, that is, to choose a strategy xi that would maximize material
payo¤ if all others were to choose that same strategy. We refer to the rst case as homo
oeconomicus and the second as homo kantientis. For arbitrary degrees of morality, 0    1,
the individuals goal is to maximize her expected material payo¤ if others were to choose
that same strategy with probability  (and statistically independently of each other).18
Since the random variables ~xj are statistically independent, the utility u (xi;x i), for
any given strategy prole x 2 Xn, is a polynomial function of the degree of morality ,
taking the value  (x) at  = 0 and the value  (xi; xi; ::; xi) at  = 1.19 For n = 2 and any
strategy pair (x; y) 2 X2 one obtains the same expression for u as in (6). For n = 3 and
any strategy triplet (x; (y; z)) 2 X3, where x is the players own strategy, one obtains
u (x; (y; z)) = (1  )2   (x; (y; z)) + (1  )   (x; (x; z))
+ (1  )   (x; (y; x)) + 2   (x; (x; x)) :
While the expression in (7) is quite involved, it is easy to determine the set of symmetric
Nash equilibrium strategies in a game between n homo moralis with the same degree of
morality. For any  2 [0; 1], let  : X  X be dened by
 (x) = arg max
y2X
u
 
y;x(n 1)

: (8)
The set of symmetric Nash equilibrium strategies is the set X  X of xed points under
,
X = fx 2 X : x 2  (x)g : (9)
By symmetry of  the condition x 2  (x) can be written more explicitly as
x 2 arg max
y2X
nX
m=1
 
n  1
m  1
!
m 1 (1  )n m   y;y(m 1);x(n m) : (10)
18In his Grundlegung zür Metaphysik der Sitten (1785), Immanuel Kant wrote Act only according to that
maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.In this vein, homo
moralis of degree of morality  can be said to act according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same
time, will that others should do likewise with probability .For a discussion of several ethical principles,
see Bergstrom (2009).
19From a mathematical viewpoint, homo moralis denes a homotopy (see e.g. Munkres, 1975), parame-
trized by  2 [0; 1], between selshness and Kantian morality.
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Before applying our general model to preference evolution, in the next subsection we
apply it to strategy evolution, the framework used in classic evolutionary game theory. Given
the analytical simplicity of strategy evolution, in comparison with preference evolution, a
question of interest is whether strategy evolution gives guidance to behavioral predictions
under preference evolution.
4 Strategy evolution
Here we adopt the assumption that was used for the original formulation of evolutionary
stability (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973), namely, that an individuals type is a strategy
that she always uses. Formally, let the set of potential types be  = X, the strategy set for
the material game   = hX; ; ni. Thus, in a population where some types  = x and  = y
are present, the unique behavioral outcome is the strategy pair (x; y), where x is played by
all individuals of type  = x and y is played by all individuals of type  = y. By symmetry
of , the material payo¤ to an individual of type x who belongs to a group where a total of
n m individuals have the same, resident, type x, andm individuals have the mutant type y,
can be written 
 
x;x(n m 1);y(m)

, where x(n m 1) is the (n m  1)-dimensional vector
whose components equal x, and y(m) is the m-dimensional vector whose components equal
y. Likewise, the material payo¤ to an individual of type y who belongs to such a group can
be written 
 
y;y(m 1);x(n m)

. Hence, given a pair of types (x; y), for each " the average
material payo¤ to a resident is uniquely determined and equal to
F (x; y; ") =
n 1X
m=0
pm (")  
 
x;x(n m 1);y(m)

; (11)
and likewise for a mutant, whose average material payo¤ is
G (x; y; ") =
nX
m=1
qm (")  
 
y;y(m 1);x(n m)

: (12)
Both F and G are continuous by virtue of the assumed continuity of the conditional proba-
bilities for the number of mutants with respect to the population share of mutants.20
20The functions F and G are generalizations, from uniform to assortative matching, of the functions used
by Broom, Cannings and Vickers (1997) in their denition of an evolutionarily stable strategy in symmetric
and nite n-player games (here x and y may be mixed strategies in a nite game).
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Under strategy evolution, then, the set of (average) material-payo¤ pairs that can arise
in population state s, V (s)  R2, is a singleton for all s 2 S = X2  (0; 1), and
f (x; y; ") = F (x; y; ") G (x; y; ") :
Furthermore, for any x; y 2 X, f (x; y; ") converges (to some real number) as " tends to zero.
By continuity of F and G, f is continuous, and a necessary condition for x to be an
evolutionarily stable strategy is
lim
"!0
f (x; y; ")  0 8y 2 X: (13)
In other words, it is necessary that the residents on average do not earn a lower material
payo¤ than the mutants when the latter are virtually absent from the population. Likewise,
a su¢ cient condition for evolutionary stability is that this inequality holds strictly for all
strategies y 6= x.
Let H : X2 ! R be the function dened by
H (y; x) = lim
"!0
G (x; y; ") : (14)
The function value H (y; x) is the average material payo¤ to a mutant with strategy y in a
population where the resident strategy is x and where the population share of mutants is van-
ishingly small. Since H (x; x) = lim"!0G (x; x; ") = lim"!0 F (x; x; ") = lim"!0 F (x; y; "),
the necessary condition (13) for a strategy x to be evolutionarily stable may be written
H (x; x)  H (y; x) 8y 2 X; (15)
or, equivalently,
x 2 arg max
y2X
H (y; x) : (16)
This condition says that for a strategy x to be evolutionarily stable, its users have to earn the
same average material payo¤ as the the most threatening mutants, those with the highest
average material payo¤ that any vanishingly rare mutant can obtain against the resident.
In a sense, thus, an evolutionarily stable type preempts entry by rare mutants, rather than
doing what would be best (in terms of material payo¤) for the residents if there were no
mutants around.21
21See also Alger and Weibull (2013) and Robson and Szentes (2014) for a similar observation. Importantly,
this logic is very di¤erent from that of group selection.
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A su¢ cient condition for a strategy x to be evolutionarily stable is that
H (x; x) > H (y; x) (17)
for all y 6= x. Interestingly, then, irrespective of n, evolutionarily stable types may be
interpreted as Nash equilibrium strategies in a derived two-player game, where nature
plays strategies against each other:
Proposition 1 Let  = X. If x is an evolutionarily stable strategy in a population where
individuals are randomly matched to play the symmetric n-player game in material payo¤s
  = hX; ; ni, then (x; x) is a Nash equilibrium of the symmetric two-player game in which
the strategy set is X and the payo¤ function is H. If (x; x) is a strict Nash equilibrium of
the latter game, then x is an evolutionarily stable strategy in   = hX; ; ni, while if (x; x) is
a not a Nash equilibrium, then x is evolutionarily unstable.
This proposition allows us to make a rst connection between strategy evolution and homo
moralis preferences. Indeed, while under strategy evolution each individual mechanistically
plays a certain strategy is programmedto execute a certain strategy we will now see
that any evolutionarily stable strategy may be viewed as if emerging from individualsfree
choice, as if they were striving to maximize a specic utility function.
To see this, consider the conditionally independent case, for which
H (y; x) =
nX
m=1
 
n  1
m  1
!
m 1 (1  )n m   y;y(m 1);x(n m) : (18)
The expression on the right-hand side is the same as the one in (10) when  = . Combining
this observation with Proposition 1 and the xed-point equation (16), we obtain:
Corollary 1 Assume conditionally independent random matching. Let  = X (strategy
evolution). If x is an evolutionarily stable strategy, then it belongs to X for  = . Every
strategy x 2 X for which  (x) is a singleton is evolutionarily stable. Every strategy x =2 X
is evolutionarily unstable.
This corollary establishes that the behavior induced under strategy evolution and con-
ditionally independent assortative matching is as if individuals were equipped with homo
moralis preferences with degree of morality equal to the index of assortativity. But what if,
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instead, evolution were to operate at the level of preferences, thereby delegatingthe strat-
egy choice to the individual? In the next section we apply our general model to preference
evolution. Compared with strategy evolution, this introduces two main challenges. First,
whereas under strategy evolution the set of potential types is identical with the strategy set,
under preference evolution there is a priori no given set of potential types. Second, whereas
under strategy evolution the behavioral outcome is uniquely determined in each population
state, under preference evolution this need not be the case.
5 Preference evolution under incomplete information
From now on, we take each type  2  to uniquely determine a continuous and symmetric
utility function u : Xn ! R, a function that its "host" strives to maximize. We focus
on the case of incomplete information, where each individual knows only his/her own type.
In other words, each individuals utility function is his or her private information. Then
an individuals behavior cannot be conditioned on the types of the others with whom (s)he
interacts. However, individual behavior may be adapted to the population state at hand (that
is, the types present in the population, and their population shares). Arguably, Bayesian Nash
equilibrium is a natural criterion to delineate the set V (s) of (average) material-payo¤ pairs
that can arise in a population state s.
More precisely, in any given state s = (;  ; ") 2 2(0; 1), a (type-homogenous Bayesian)
Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies, one for each type, such that each strategy is a best
reply for any player of that type in the given population state. In other words, all players
of the same type use the same strategy, and each individual player nds his or her strategy
optimal, given his or her utility function.
Denition 3 In any state s = (;  ; ") 2 2  (0; 1), a strategy pair (x^; y^) 2 X2 is a
(type-homogenous Bayesian) Nash Equilibrium if(
x^ 2 arg maxx2X
Pn 1
m=0 pm (")  u
 
x; y^(m); x^(n m 1)

y^ 2 arg maxy2X
Pn
m=1 qm (")  u
 
y; y^(m 1); x^(n m)

:
(19)
Let BNE (s)  X2 denote the set of (type-homogenous Bayesian) Nash equilibria in
state s = (;  ; "), that is, all solutions (x^; y^) of (19). For given types  and  , this denes
an equilibrium correspondence BNE (;  ; ) : (0; 1)  X2 that maps mutant population
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shares " to the associated set of equilibria. As discussed above, under the assumption that
all probabilities in (19) are continuous in " and converge as " ! 0, the domain of these
probabilities was continuously extended to [0; 1). This allows us to likewise extend the
domain of BNE (;  ; ). By a slight generalization of the arguments in the proof of Lemma
1 in Alger and Weibull (2013) one obtains:
Lemma 1 The set BNE (;  ; ") is compact for each (;  ; ") 2 2  [0; 1), and the corre-
spondence BNE (;  ; ) : [0; 1)  X2 is upper hemi-continuous. Moreover, BNE (;  ; ") 6= ?
if u and u are concave in their rst arguments.
We will henceforth focus on types  and  such that BNE (;  ; ") is non-empty for all
" 2 [0; 1). This holds, for example, if all functions u are concave in their rst argument,
the players own strategy. Given a population state s = (;  ; ") and some Nash equilib-
rium (x^; y^) 2 BNE (s), the average equilibrium material payo¤s to residents and mutants,
respectively, equal F (x^; y^; ") and G (x^; y^; "), where F and G are dened in (11) and (12),
respectively.
For each type  2  let  : X  X denote the best-reply correspondence,
 (y) = arg max
x2X
u
 
x;y(n 1)
 8y 2 X;
and X  X its set of xed points,
X = fx 2 X : x 2  (x)g :
Given the unrestricted nature of the set of potential types, for any resident type there
may be other types such that, if appearing in rare mutants, would give rise to the same
behavior as that of the residents. We dene the behavioral clones to a type  as those types
that, as vanishingly rare mutants among residents of type , are behaviorally potentially
indistinguishable from residents in the sense that there exists some equilibrium in which
they, as rare mutants, behave just as a resident could rationally do. Formally, for any given
type  2 , this is the subset22
~ () =

 2  : (x; y) 2 BNE (;  ; 0) for some x 2 X and y 2  (x)
	
: (20)
22This denition labels a slightly wider range of types as behavioral clones than according to our de-
nition in Alger and Weibull (2013);   ~ (). This slight weakening permits a slightly more powerful
stability claim.
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Examples of such behavioral alikesare individuals with utility functions that are positive
a¢ ne transformations of the utility function of the residents, and also individuals for whom
some strategy in X is dominant.23
The second statement in the result below will use the following denition (from Alger and
Weibull, 2013): the type set  is rich if for each strategy x 2 X there exists some type  2 
for which this strategy is strictly dominant. Such a type  will be said to be committed to its
strategy x. The following result is a generalization of Theorem 1 in Alger and Weibull (2013)
from pairwise interactions (n = 2) to interactions with an arbitrary number of participants
(n  2); furthermore, the instability result now also applies to types for which there are
multiple equilibria.
Theorem 1 Assume conditionally independent assortativity. Homo moralis with degree of
morality  =  is evolutionarily stable against all types  =2 ~ (). If  is rich and X\X =
?, then  is evolutionarily unstable.
Proof : Since  is continuous, and, given ;  2 , all functions pm and qm are continuous
in " by hypothesis, also the two functions F;G : X2  [0; 1) ! R (given ;  2 ) are
continuous.
For the rst claim, let  =  (homo moralis of degree of morality ) and  =2 ~ (), and
suppose that (x; y) 2 BNE (;  ; 0). Then x 2 X so u
 
x;x(n 1)
  u  y;x(n 1). Since
 =2 ~ (): y =2  (x). Hence, u
 
x;x(n 1)

> u
 
y;x(n 1)

, or, equivalently, F (x; y; 0) >
G (x; y; 0). Let g : X2 ! R be dened by g (x; y) = F (x; y; 0) G (x; y; 0). By continuity of
F and G, g is continuous. Since BNE (;  ; 0) is compact and g (x; y) > 0 on BNE (;  ; 0),
we have min(x;y)2BNE(; ;0) g (x; y) =  for some  > 0. Again by continuity of F and G,
there exists a neighborhood U  X2 [0; 1) of the compact set BNE (;  ; 0)f0g such that
F (x; y; ") G (x; y; ") > =2 for all (x; y; ") 2 U . Since BNE (;  ; ) : [0; 1)  X2 is compact-
valued and upper hemi-continuous, there exists an " > 0 such that BNE (;  ; ") [0; "]  U
for all " 2 [0; "). It follows that F (x; y; ")   G (x; y; ") > =2 for all " 2 [0; ") and all
(x; y) 2 BNE (;  ; "). Setting V (;  ; ") = BNE (;  ; ") we thus have f (;  ; ") > =2 for
all " 2 [0; "), establishing the rst claim.
For the second claim, let  2  be such that X \ X = ? and suppose that x 2 X.
Then u

x^;x
(n 1)


> u

x;x
(n 1)


for some x^ 2 X. If  is rich, there exists a type  2 
23For example, if x 2 X, let u (xi;x i)    (xi   x)2.
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for which x^ is strictly dominant, so individuals of that type will always play x^. By denition
of u,
G (x; x^; 0) = u

x^;x
(n 1)


> u

x;x
(n 1)


= F (x; x^; 0) :
Let hxt; yt; "tit2N be any sequence from X2  (0; 1) such that "t ! 0, xt ! x 2 X, and
(xt; yt) 2 BNE (;  ; "t) for all t 2 N. Such a sequence exists by upper hemi-continuity of
BNE (;  ; ). Then yt = x^ for all t 2 N. Since F and G are continuous, G (xt; x^; "t) >
F (xt; x^; "t) for all t su¢ ciently large. Let v(t) = (F (xt; x^; "t) ; G (xt; x^; "t)). For V (;  ; ") =
BNE (;  ; ") we thus have v(t) 2 V (;  ; "t) and thus f (;  ; "t) < 0 for all t large enough.
Q.E.D.
This result has implications for a question of particular interest for economists, namely,
whether the common assumption of selshness is justiable from an evolutionary perspective.
To see this, note that a homo moralis with degree of morality  = 0 is selsh, for (s)he cares
only about own material welfare. The theorem implies that if there is some assortativity ( >
0) and if the equilibrium strategy in a n-player group consisting solely of selsh individuals
di¤ers from that in a n-player group consisting solely of homo moralis with degree of morality
 = , the selshness type would not be evolutionarily stable; it would be vulnerable to small-
scale invasions of other, less selsh types. Instead, homo moralis with degree of morality
equal to the index of assortativity stands out as being favored by evolution. Not only are
these preferences (or any other preferences such that residents with such preferences, in
a population with no mutants, are behaviorally indistinguishable from homo moralis with
 = ) evolutionarily stable; preferences that induce behavior that di¤ers from that of homo
moralis with  =  are evolutionarily unstable, granted the set of potential types is rich.
The following result obtains by combining the previous results and observations.
Corollary 2 Assume conditionally independent assortativity. In material games   = hX; ; ni
where homo moralis with degree of morality  =  has a unique best reply to each strategy
in X, preference evolution under incomplete information induces the same behaviors as
strategy evolution.
This corollary establishes a second connection between strategy evolution and homo
moralis preferences, a connection that was established for the case n = 2 in Alger and
Weibull (2013): evolutionarily stable strategies may be viewed as emerging from prefer-
ence evolution when individuals are not programmed to strategies but are rational and play
equilibria under incomplete information.
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6 Games in euclidean spaces
How does homo moralis behave, in particular when compared to homo oeconomicus? More
precisely, what are the equilibrium strategies among homo moralis of the same degree of
morality  2 [0; 1]? We answer this question rst for symmetric games in euclidean spaces
in general, then in more detail in several canonical such games. In force of Corollaries 1
and 2, under certain regularity conditions it is su¢ cient to identify the evolutionarily stable
strategies.
Suppose that X is a non-empty subset of Rk for some k 2 N. We will say that x is strictly
evolutionarily stable (SES) if (17) holds for all y 6= x, and we will call a strategy x 2 X
locally strictly evolutionarily stable (LSES) if (17) holds for all y 6= x in some neighborhood
of x. If, moreover,  : Xn ! R is di¤erentiable, then so is H : X2 ! R, and standard
calculus can be used to nd evolutionarily stable strategies. Let ryH (y; x) be the gradient
of H with respect to y. We call this the evolution gradient ; it is the gradient of the (average)
material payo¤ to a mutant strategy y in a population state with residents playing x, and
vanishingly few mutants. Writing  for the inner product and boldface 0 for the origin,
the following result follows from standard calculus:24
Proposition 2 Let X  Rk for some k 2 N, and let x 2 int (X). If H : X2 ! R
is continuously di¤erentiable on a neighborhood of (x; x) 2 X2, then condition (i) below
is necessary for x to be LSES, and conditions (i) and (ii) are together su¢ cient for x to
be LSES. Furthermore, any strategy x for which condition (i) is violated is evolutionarily
unstable.
(i) ryH (y; x)jy=x = 0;
(ii) (x  y)  ryH (y; x) > 0 for all y 6= x in some neighborhood of x.
The rst condition says that there should be no direction of marginal improvement in
material payo¤ for a rare mutant at the resident type. The second condition ensures that
if some nearby rare mutant y 6= x were to arise in a vanishingly small population share,
then the mutants material payo¤ would be increasing in the direction leading back to the
resident type, x.
24See, e.g., Theorem 2 in Section 7.4 of Luenberger (1969), which also shows that Proposition 2 in fact
holds when the gradient is the Gateaux derivative in general vector spaces
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Conditions (i) and (ii) in Proposition 2 can be used to obtain remarkably simple and
operational and conditions for evolutionarily stable strategies if the strategy set X is one-
dimensional (k = 1) and  is continuously di¤erentiable. Writing h for the partial derivative
of  with respect to its hth argument, one obtains:25
Proposition 3 Assume conditionally independent matching with index of assortativity ,
and suppose that  is continuously di¤erentiable on a neighborhood of x^ 2 Xn, where X  R.
If x^ 2 int (X) is evolutionarily stable, then
1 (x^) +   (n  1)  n (x^) = 0; (21)
where x^ is the n-dimensional vector whose components all equal x^. If x^ 2 int (X) does not
satisfy (21), then x^ is evolutionarily unstable.
Proof : If  is continuously di¤erentiable, H is continuously di¤erentiable. Hence, if
x 2 int (X), Proposition 2 holds, and the following condition is necessary for x to be an
evolutionarily stable strategy:
rHy (y; x)jy=x =
nX
m=1
 
n  1
m  1
!
m 1 (1  )n m
"
mX
k=1
k
 
y;y(m 1);x(n m)
#
jy=x
= 0:
By symmetry of , this equation may be written
nX
m=1
 
n  1
m  1
!
m 1 (1  )n m [1 (x) + (m  1) n (x)] = 0; (22)
where x is the n-dimensional vector whose components all equal x. Now, since
nX
m=1
 
n  1
m  1
!
m 1 (1  )n m (m  1) = (n  1)  ;
the expression in (22) simplies to 1 (x) + (n  1)    n (x) = 0. Q.E.D.
Next we study several canonical interactions for which we can use (21) to determine the
set of evolutionarily stable strategies. We conclude by briey considering a game where not
all regularity conditions are met.26
25Symmetry of  implies that n (x^) = j (x^) for all j > 1.
26For examples with n = 2, see also Sections 4 and 6 in Alger and Weibull (2013).
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6.1 Public goods
Consider a material game in which each individual makes a contribution (or exerts an e¤ort)
at some personal cost, and where the sum of all contributions give rise to a benet to all.
More specically, letting xi  0 denote the contribution of individual i, x i the vector of
otherscontributions, and with X = R+, let
 (xi;x i) = B
 
nX
j=1
xj
!
  C (xi)
for some continuous (benet and cost) functions B;C : R+ ! R+ that are twice di¤erentiable
on R++ with B0; C 0 > 0, B00  0 and C 00  0. Under conditionally independent assortativity,
the associated functionH (see (18)) is concave, implying that (21) is a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for an individual contribution x^ > 0 to be evolutionarily stable. The relevant
partial derivatives are
1 (x^) = B
0 (nx^)  C 0 (x^) and n (x^) = B0 (nx^) ;
so a contribution x^ > 0 is evolutionarily stable if and only if
[1 + (n  1)] B0 (nx^) = C 0 (x^) : (23)
This equation has at most one solution, and it has a unique solution x^ > 0 if [1 + (n  1)] 
B0 (0) > C 0 (0), an arguably natural condition in many applications, and which we henceforth
assume to be met.27 Under this condition, the unique evolutionarily stable contribution
is increasing in the index of assortativity. For  = 0, equation (23) is nothing but the
standard formula according to which own marginal benet equals own marginal cost;
x^ then corresponds to what homo oeconomicus would do when playing against other homo
oeconomicus. At the other extreme, for  = 1, the benevolent social planners solution
obtains; then x^ solves maxx2X [B (nx)  C (x)]. For intermediary values of , intermediary
values of x^ obtain, and this may or may not be decreasing in group size n.
To see this, consider the case when both B and C are power functions; let B (x)  xb
for some b 2 (0; 1) and C (x)  xc for some c  1. Then the unique evolutionarily stable
individual contribution is
x^ =

b
c


1
n
+

1  1
n



nb
1=(c b)
27We also note that this holds true even if B would be linear, granted C 00 > 0. For although others
contributions are then strategically irrelevant for the individual player, a positive index of assortativity
makes the individual willing to contribute more than under uniform random matching.
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This contribution is decreasing (increasing) in group size when the index of assortativity is
zero (one). See diagram below, showing x^ as a function of n for  = 0, 0:25, 0:5, 0:75 and 1
(higher curves for higher ).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.0
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0.4
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n
x
Figure 1: The evolutionarily stable individual contribution in the public-goods game.
The fact that for low , the evolutionarily stable individual contribution is decreasing
in n is not surprising, since as n increases, the marginal benet to an individuals material
payo¤ of her contribution decreases as the sum of otherscontributions increases. What is
more surprising, perhaps, is that the total contribution is increasing in n. To see this, note
that whenever C is a power function, (23) can be written as
[1 + (n  1)]  nc 1 B0 (nx^) = C 0 (nx^) :
Given n, the left-hand side is decreasing, and the right-hand side increasing, in the evolution-
arily stable aggregate contribution, nx^. The factor before the marginal benet is increasing
in n. The intuition for this is that, beyond the direct, detrimental e¤ect of n on the mar-
ginal benet of a contribution, there is an indirect, benecial e¤ect, which is related to risk.
Indeed, a vanishingly rare mutant faces uncertainty as to the contributions his opponents
will make. For n = 2, the uncertainty is hefty; a mutants opponent either makes the same
contribution or the resident contribution. As n increases, the mutants uncertainty becomes
less hefty, since then the (empirical) average contribution from other group members is ran-
domly distributed between his own contribution and the resident contribution, with less and
less variance as n increases. Hence, adjusting for the direct e¤ect of the higher n on the
marginal benet of making a contribution, the risk associated with mutating decreases as n
increases, and hence, a higher total contribution can be sustained.
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Remark 1 The public goods interaction described here is symmetric. However, as noted
before, our general model also applies to asymmetric interactions as long as these are ex
ante symmetric, i.e. such that each individual at the outset is just as likely to be cast in
either player role (as, for instance, in a laboratory experiment). To illustrate, suppose that
only some individuals are free to give a contribution. More precisely, let ~A  f1; :::; ng
denote the random set of active players. Suppose further that ex ante, each individual faces
the same probability p 2 (0; 1) to get an active player role, that is, to be in the set ~A. A
players strategy, is then a contribution to make if called upon to be active (without being
told who else is active). Let xi denote player is strategy so dened. We may then write the
ex ante payo¤ function of any player i in the symmetric form
 (xi;x i) = p E
24B
0@X
j2 ~A
xj
1A j i 2 ~A
35 p C (xi)+ (1  p) E
24B
0@X
j2 ~A
xj
1A j i =2 ~A
35 ;
where the expectation is taken with respect to the random draw of the subset ~A.
6.2 Team work
Suppose instead that the jointly produced good in the previous example is a private good,
split evenly between the members of the group or team. The same analysis applies, with the
only di¤erence that the individual benet be divided by n. One then obtains the following
necessary and su¢ cient condition for the evolutionarily stable individual contribution:
1
n
+

1  1
n



B0 (nx^) = C 0 (x^) :
Comparing this with the public goods case (equation (23)), we note that the evolution-
arily stable individual contribution now is smaller, that it is still increasing in the index of
assortativity, and that it is now necessarily decreasing in group size.
6.3 Contests
Many real interactions involve competing for a prize. Examples include competition between
job seekers for a vacancy, between rms for a contract, between employees for promotion, etc.
Such interactions may be modeled as a contest in which each participant makes a nonnegative
e¤ort at some personal cost, and where each participants e¤ort probabilistically translates
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to a result,and the participant with the bestresult wins the prize. More specically, let
xi  0 be participant i0s e¤ort, x i the vector of e¤orts of the others, and let ~yi = xi + "i be
participant is result (as valued by the "umpire"). With absolutely continuously distributed
random terms, ties occur with probability zero. For quadratic costs of e¤ort, the material
payo¤ to participant i is:
 (xi;x i) = b  Pr [~yi > ~yj 8j 6= i]  1
2
x2i (24)
where b > 0 is the value of the prize in question. This denes a continuously and (innitely)
di¤erentiable function on Xn = Rn+. For Gumbel distributed random terms, the winning
probability for each participant i satises28
Pr [~yi > ~yj 8j 6= i] = e
xiPn
j=1 e
xj
8x 2 Xn:
From this it is easily veried that a necessary condition (21) for an e¤ort level x^ > 0 to be
evolutionarily stable boils down to
x^ =
1  
n


1  1
n

 b: (25)
The evolutionarily stable individual e¤ort is proportional to the value b of the price, linearly
decreasing (towards zero) in the index of assortativity, , and decreasing in n (recall that
n  2). Aggregate e¤ort, however, is increasing in n. See diagram, drawn for b = 2 and
 = 0:5.
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Figure 2: The evolutionarily stable indidividual e¤ort in the contest game.
28This is a standard result in random utility theory, see, e.g., Anderson et al. (1992).
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6.4 Cournot competition
Consider material payo¤ functions of the following linear-quadratic form:
 (xi;x i) = axi   b 
 X
j 6=i
xj
!
 xi   c  x2i ; (26)
for positive a, b and c, where xi  0 is player is action. For b = c this is the prot to a
rm in Cournot competition among n identical rms facing linear demand with intercept a
and slope  b, with zero production cost, and with xi  0 being player is output. Material
payo¤ functions of this form may also represent common pool interactions in which the
total use by the others a¤ect negatively each individuals benet from using the common
pool.
The material payo¤ to each player is strictly concave in the players own strategy, and
equation (23) gives
x^ =
a
2c+ (1 + ) (n  1) b: (27)
The standard result whereby individual (aggregate) output decreases (increases) in n obtains
here also, for any  2 [0; 1]; the more competitors, the less individual output or pool usage
but the more aggregate output or usage. Moreover, individual and aggregate output or
usage is decreasing in the index of assortativity . Interpreted in terms of standard Cournot
oligopoly (each rm striving to maximize its prot and b = c), the individual output level
when there are n rms in the market is then a= (n+ 1), a result we obtain when  = 0.
See diagram below, showing the evolutionarily stable output per rm as a function of the
number of rms in the market, for a = b = c = 1 and  = 0, 0:5 and 1 (higher curves for
higher ).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
n
x
Figure 3: The evolutionarily stable rm output in the Cournot competition game.
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By contrast, aggregate output nx^ (or aggregate usage of the common pool) is increasing
in the number of rms (users), from a= (2c) towards the limit a= (b+ b) that obtains as the
number of rms (users) tends to innity.
6.5 Helping others
People often help others, also when no reward or reciprocation is expected. To model such
behaviors, consider a group of n ex ante identical individuals, and suppose that with some
exogenous probability p 2 (0; 1) exactly one individual loses one unit of wealth, with equal
probability for all individuals when this happens. The n  1 others observe this event, and
each of them may then help the unfortunate individual by transferring some personal wealth.
These decisions are voluntary and simultaneous. For any individual level of wealth w  0, let
v (w) be the individuals indirect utility from consumption, where v meets the usual Inada
conditions.
We model this as a game where initial wealth is normalized to unity:
 (xi;x i) = (1  p)  v (1) + p 
"
1  1
n

v (1  xi) + 1
n
v
 X
j 6=i
xj
!#
Here xi  0 is is voluntary transfer in case another individual is hit by the wealth loss.
Applying equation (23), for an individual transfer x^ 2 (0; 1) to be evolutionarily stable, it
must satisfy
v0 (1  x^) =   v0 [(n  1) x^] : (28)
This equation uniquely determines x^ 2 (0; 1), since the left-hand side is continuously and
strictly increasing in x^, from v0 (1) towards plus innity, and the right-hand side is contin-
uously and strictly decreasing in x^, from plus innity to v0 (n  1). It follows immediately
from (28) that this transfer is an increasing function of the index of assortativity  and a
decreasing function of group size n. Both e¤ects are intuitively expected; higher assortativ-
ity makes helpfulness more worthwhile and more individuals watching the wealth-loss makes
free-riding among them the more severe. In the special case when indirect utility is a power
function, v (w)  wa for some a 2 (0; 1), one obtains
x^ =
1=(1 a)
n  1 + 1=(1 a) :
The diagram below shows the evolutionarily stable transfer as a function of group size,
for a = 0:5 and  = 0:25, 0:5 and 1 (higher curves for higher ). While no transfers are
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given under uniform random matching ( = 0), post-transfer wealth levels are equalized
when  = 1, so full insurance then holds, while partial insurance obtains for intermediate
values of .
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0.0
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0.4
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n
x
Figure 4: The evolutionarily stable transfer in the helping game.
Furthermore, it is easy to verify that the aggregate transfer, nx^, is increasing in n and
converges to 1=(1 a) as n!1.
6.6 Coordination
Many strategic interactions involve some element of coordination and thus the possibility
of multiple equilibria. In order to clarify whether or not homo moralis then has unique or
multiple best replies, we carry out this analysis directly in terms of equilibrium play among
homo moralis. Consider the symmetric two-by-two game with material payo¤s 
a; a 0; c
c; 0 b; b
!
for 0 < b < a and c < a. There are three Nash equilibria and two strict equilibria, with
payo¤s (a; a) and (b; b).29 Let x be a players probability for playing the rst pure strategy.
Then X = [0; 1] and
 (x; y) = a  xy + b  (1  x) (1  y) + c  (1  x) y
29The rst strict equilibrium thus payo¤ dominates the second, and the second risk dominates the rst i¤
b  a  c.
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We proceed to identify the homo moralis xed-point set X for all  2 [0; 1]. For  = 0
one immediately obtains
X0 =

0;
b
a+ b  c; 1

:
For 0 <   1,
u (x; y) = (1  )(axy + b (1  x) (1  y) + c (1  x) y)+
 
ax2 + b (1  x)2 + c (1  x)x ;
so
@u (x; y)
@x
= (1  )  (ay   b (1  y)  cy) +   (2ax  2b (1  x) + c  2cx)
and @2u (x; y) =@x2 = 2  (a+ b  c) > 0; the utility function of homo moralis of any
positive degree of morality is strictly convex in his/her own strategy. Hence, X  f0; 1g
when 0 <   1. As is easily veried,
u (1; 1) = a+ 4b+ (1  ) c > b+ (1  ) c = u (0; 1)
so 1 2 X for all  2 [0; 1]. Likewise, u (0; 0) = b and u (1; 0) = a, so that 0 2 X if and
only if   b=a. Hence, X has three elements when  = 0, two elements when 0 <   b=a
and one elements when  > b=a.
Applying Corollary 1, we conclude that no mixed strategy is evolutionarily stable when
 > 0, and that x = 1 is the unique evolutionarily stable strategy when  > b=a. For  = 0
it is well-known (see e.g. Weibull, 1995), that both pure strategies are evolutionarily stable
while the mixed Nash equilibrium strategy is not. From Corollary 2, we deduce that both
pure strategies are evolutionarily stable when  < b=a.
In sum: All evolutionarily stable strategies are pure. For  < b=a both pure strategies are
evolutionarily stable while for  > b=a only the rst pure strategy is evolutionarily stable.
7 Conclusion
To understand human societies it is necessary to understand human motivation. In this
paper we build on a large literature in biology and in economics, initiated by Maynard
Smith and Price (1973), to propose a theoretical framework within which one may study
the evolution of human motivational types by way of natural selection. The framework is
based upon a general denition of an evolutionarily stable type, where an individuals type
guides his or her behavior in interactions in groups of any size. The framework may be
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applied to interactions where otherspreferences are known or unknown, and it allows for
assortativity in the process by which individuals are matched together to interact. Since our
analysis focuses on whether a homogenous population may withstand a small-scale invasion
of individuals of a di¤erent type, a key factor is the probability with which mutants are
matched with other mutants when these are vanishingly rare. In this paper we focus on
matching processes in which such assortativity may be conveniently expressed in terms of
the probability that another individual with whom a mutant interacts also is a mutant (the
index of assortativity; Bergstrom, 2003).
As a benchmark, we rst apply the framework to strategy evolution. We then apply the
model to preference evolution under incomplete information with few assumptions about the
nature of preferences. As in our model with pairwise interactions (Alger and Weibull, 2013)
we nd that the class of homo moralis preferences stands out as a winner in the evolutionary
race. Indeed, we nd that (a) within the class of utility functions that are continuous in the
strategy prole, homo moralis preferences are evolutionarily stable, and (b) under quite weak
assumptions, any preferences that lead to di¤erent behaviors from that of homo moralis with
the rightdegree of morality are evolutionarily unstable. Furthermore, equilibrium behavior
in a homogeneous population consisting of homo moralis with this degree of morality is the
same as under strategy evolution.
Our model claries how group size a¤ects the evolutionarily stable types and the ensuing
behaviors. As shown above, group size has no e¤ect on evolutionarily stable types when
these are preferences under incomplete information; homo moralis preferences with degree
of morality equal to the index of assortativity stand out as the winner in the evolutionary
race, independent of group size and of the (material) game played. By contrast, group size
does a¤ect equilibrium behavior, in groups consisting of identical homo moralis, as illustrated
in the examples.
Although general, our model relies on a number of simplifying assumptions. Relaxation
of these is a task that has to be left for future research. Moreover, we only apply our general
denition of evolutionary stability to two cases, strategy evolution and preference evolution
under incomplete information. Applications to complete or partially incomplete information
are called for, in particular in settings where the random matching is not exogenous, as here,
but at least partly endogenous. This is a major analytical challenge, however, opening the
door to signalling and mimicry, a very rich, important and exciting research area.
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8 Appendix: A class of matching processes
The matching process to be outlined here is a variant of the model of pairwise matching
sketched in Section 5.2 of Alger and Weibull (2013). Let n, k and N be integers greater
than one, and imagine a nite population of individuals i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng. The population
is divided into islands of equal size, each island consisting of k > n individuals (and
N is some multiple of k). Initially all individuals are of type . Suddenly there is an
outburst of mutation to  on one of the islands, and only there. Each individual on that
island has probability  of mutating and individual mutations are statistically independent.
Hence, the random number M of mutants is binomially distributed M  Bin (k; ). We
note that in this mutation process the same random number M is also the total number of
mutants in the population at large, so the population share M=N of mutants is a random
variable with expectation " = E [M=N ] = k=N . A group of size n is now formed (to play
our game) as follows, and this is an event that is statistically independent of the above-
mentioned mutation. First, one of the islands is selected, with equal probability for each
island. Secondly, n individuals from the selected island are randomly recruited to form the
group, drawn as a random sample without replacement from amongst the k islanders and
with equal probability for each islander to be sampled.
Consider an individual i who has been recruited to the group, and assume that the only
information we have about her is her type. If the individual is of type  , it is necessary
that M > 0 and that she is from the island where the mutation occurred, so the random
number of other mutants in her group is binomially distributed Bin (n  1; ). With Xi
denoting the type of individual i, and T the total number of mutants in the group, we have,
for m = 1; 2; :::; n:
Pr [T = m j Xi =  ] =
 
n  1
m  1
!
m 1 (1  )n m : (29)
If ourindividual i instead is of the resident type , then M = 0 is possible and she may
well be from another island than where the mutation occurred. We thus have
Pr [T = m j Xi = ]  k
N

 
n  1
m
!
m (1  )n m 1
for all m > 0. Moreover, for any two group members i and j:
Pr [Xj =  j Xi =  ] =  and Pr [Xj =  j Xi = ]  k=N:
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Keeping , n and k constant, we may write Pr [j; "] for Pr [Xj =  j Xi = ] and Pr [j ; "]
for Pr [Xj =  j Xi =  ], and these are continuous functions of " = k=N . In addition, we
have 1   "  Pr [j; "]  1 and Pr [j ; "] = 1   . Letting N ! 1, we obtain " ! 0
and Pr [j; "] ! 1. Hence, lim"!0  (") = , so  = . Moreover, in our general notation:
lim"!0 pm (") = 0, and
qm (") =
 
n  1
m  1
!
m 1 (1  )n m
for all " 2 (0; 1) and m = 1; ::; n, so (5) follows immediately.
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